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** Independent Researcher, Brazil,
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Abstract
Environmental policy traditionally relies on financial incentives and direct regulation to achieve
desirable outcomes in terms of conservation and pro-environmental behavior. Empirical research
has shown that market based approaches are more cost-effective than direct regulation. However,
experimental research has demonstrated that a combination of financial and non-financial
incentives (specifically empathy nudging) is, on average, even more effective than a financial nudge,
or empathy nudge, individually. The current study looks at environmental policy, specifically
financial and empathy nudging, in the agricultural context. The increase of the number of farms
headed by females raises the question whether previous findings of the effectiveness of these
nudges are gender specific or gender neutral. We investigate this question using data from a framed
laboratory experiment in the context of farmers’ conservation behavior. Specifically, we compare
the change in conservation efforts of females and males in response to financial incentives and
empathy nudging applied separately and at the same time. Our findings show that both females and
males are moderately affected by financial nudges, but only females are affected by empathy
nudges separately. The combination of both nudges is economically and statistically significantly
higher than each nudge individually, and substantially higher for females than for males. This
implies that policy makers could increase the effectiveness of environmental policy by accounting
for these gender specific differences in the policy design.
Keywords: gender differences, environmental behavior, economic experiment, empathy nudging,
financial nudging, gender stereotypes
1. Introduction
From a traditional, and perhaps still mainstream, economic perspective, financial incentives are the
most effective tool for encouraging economic agents to perform desired actions. In the
environmental context this is reflected by the increased push away from command-and-control
regulations to emissions charges and cap-and-trade schemes. While the empirical evidence
suggests that these market based approaches are more cost effective than command-and-control
regulation (e.g., Seskin et al., 1983; Spofford, 19841; Krupnick, 1986), it remains unclear in how far
nudging people to do the right thing can substitute for costly pecuniary incentive based schemes,
Spofford (1984) estimates that when it comes to particulate matter in the Lower Delaware Valley, the
command-and-control approach was up to 22 times more expensive than the least cost method. Other studies
have found smaller differences, typically in the range of 30% to 600%.
1
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or, if not substitute, in how far empathy nudging can augment pecuniary incentive schemes and
increase their effectiveness. Experimental studies by N. Czap et al. (2015) and H. Czap et al. (2016)
have shown that in environmental context empathy nudging by itself was less effective than
financial nudging. The combination of financial incentives and empathy nudging, however, had a
statistically and economically highly significant and positive impact on pro-environmental choices,
compared to each individual nudge. The fact that the combination works much better than the sum
of the parts, is theoretically supported by the metaeconomic framework and dual-interest theory
(Hayes and Lynne, 2004, 2013; Lynne, 2006; Lynne et al., in press; Sheeder and Lynne, 2011, and
the closely related dual motive theory (Cory, 2006; Tomer, 2012) which assert that individuals are
motivated not only by self-interest, but by a shared empathy-based other-interest. The current
paper expands on this analysis by looking into gender specific differences in the empathy and
financial nudges. Understanding these differences will help environmental policy-makers better
tailor the design of policies to the target population and improve overall effectiveness.
It is plausible that gender differences in behavior and attitudes may be connected to gender
differences in empathy. According to some studies, women are more empathetic than men
(Goldenfeld et al., 2005; Baron-Cohen, 2009), which certainly conforms to gender stereotypes.
However, studies that find women to be more empathetic than men are based on self- reported
measures (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; Schieman & van Gundy, 2000; Toussaint & Webb, 2007).
These gender differences disappear when empathy was measured either with physiological or nonverbal behavior (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983). According to Ickes et al. (2000) gender differences in
empathy are found in two cases; first, when subjects know they are being evaluated on empathy
and, secondly, when “empathy-relevant gender role expectations and obligations are made salient”
(p. 95).
If there are no differences in levels of empathy, the question is whether we nonetheless observe
gender differences in other-regarding preferences, attitudes and behavior. Evidence from economic
studies involving other-regarding preferences in males and females is mixed. Some find women to
be more generous (e.g., Seguino, Stevens, & Lutz, 1996; Eckel & Grossman, 1998; Kamas, Preston, &
Baum, 2008; N. Czap & H. Czap, 2010; H. Czap et al., 2010), others find men to be more generous
(e.g., Brown-Kruse & Hummels, 1993; Anderson, DiTraglia, & Gerlach, 2011), and still others find no
differences between men and women (e.g., Bolton & Katok, 1995; Frey & Meirer, 2004). These
inconsistencies have been attributed to differences in experimental designs, contexts, and
motivational factors (Eckel & Grossmann, 2008; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Fujimoto & Park, 2010).
Environmental (economic) studies are a little more skewed towards females being more
environmentally concerned for general or specific issues (e.g., Mohai, 1992; Zelezny et al., 2000,
Caiazza & Barrett 2003; Xiao & Dunlap, 2007), even though Luzar and Cosse (1998) did not find a
significant difference in willingness to pay for rural water quality between the genders.
The aforementioned research analyzes differences in baseline values for males and females in
terms of empathy as well as other-regarding preferences/behavior. This might be important for
policy makers when it comes to personnel, or similar, decisions, but is perhaps less relevant when it
comes to policy designs that intends to change behavior of economic agents. As exemplified by the
“Nudge Unit”2 in the UK, nudging has gained traction as a publicly accepted and supported
approach of improving policy outcomes in, among others, the environmental, health, and financial
context. Numerous papers have shown that nudges are effective in changing behavior (e.g., Clark et
al., 2014; N. Czap et al., 2014, 2015; H. Czap et al., 2016; Fryer et al. 2008; Gneezy & Rustichini
2000a,b; Gneezy et al. 2011; HoWook et al., 2015; Jalava et al., 2015; Lanzini & Thogersen, 2014;
Officially known as the “Behavioral Insights Team”. See
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/behavioural-insights-team for more information.
2
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Marteau et al., 2011; Strohacker et al., 2014), albeit not always in the expected direction, as
exemplified by the research of Gneezy & Rustichini (2000a,b), Gneezy et al. (2011), and Sudarshan
(2013) who demonstrate that financial incentives may lead to crowding out of intrinsic motivation
or non-pecuniary nudges and, thus, lead to a decrease in the desired behavior rather than an
increase.
As of yet, there is, however, very little research (that we are aware of) that deals with gender
specific differences in the effectiveness of these nudges. Clark et al. (2014) show that an
informational nudge significantly increases retirement contributions by young male employees and
significantly decreases retirement contributions by older male employees. Females, in contrast, do
not display any significant change in behavior. This gender difference in responsiveness to nudges
is consistent with Fryer et al. (2008), who demonstrate that the introduction of financial incentives
exacerbates gender differences by increasing male performance on a SAT-style math test, while
leaving female performance unchanged. In contrast, N. Czap et al. (2014) find that females respond
more to emotionally based punishment calling for empathy compared to males, while both females
and males do not respond much to the monetary fines. Jalava et al. (2015) look at the test
performance of students in response to various non-financial incentive schemes. Their results show
that boys are only motivated to improve performance by rank-based incentives, whereas girls also
react positively to symbolic rewards.
As evident from the above discussion, in addition to the scarce number of papers, there is also
inconsistent evidence on gender differences, suggesting that any gender differences observed (or
lack thereof) are probably highly context and nudge dependent (Khachaturyan and N.Czap, 2016).
This paper contributes to this literature by looking at evidence from a lab experiment on gender
differences in the effectiveness of financial and empathy nudges in an environmental context. The
next section presents the hypotheses of this study. The third section explains the experimental
design and procedures. The fourth section discusses the results. And the last section concludes our
study and provides environmental policy recommendations.
2. Study Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 is looking at the effectiveness of a financial nudge in comparison to a empathy nudge
for each gender separately. The focus here is to determine whether for the given experimental
parameters the empathy nudge is more or less powerful than the financial nudge or the
combination of nudges. As mentioned above, it was established in N. Czap et al. (2015) and H. Czap
et al. (2016) that a financial nudge is more effective than an empathy nudge on average, and that
the combination of both is significantly more powerful than each nudge individually. However, it
remains to be shown whether this is consistent across genders.
Hypothesis 1: In environmental decisions, the relative effectiveness of empathy and financial nudging
depends on gender.
Specifically, based on traditional gender stereotypes we speculate that:
Hypothesis 1a. Males are motivated more by financial nudging than by empathy nudging.
Hypothesis 1b. Females are motivated more by empathy nudging than by financial nudging.
Hypothesis 1c. Females and males are motivated more by a combination of empathy and
financial nudging than by each nudging used individually.
Hypothesis 2 directly compares differences in impact of financial and empathy nudging between
genders. As discussed in the literature section, there have been various attempts at establishing
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whether women are more empathetic than men, and in how far there are differences in actual
altruistic behavior. Very few papers, however, have discussed in how far we can nudge different
genders to behave in a particular way, arguably a much more relevant question from a policy
making perspective, than establishing differences in baseline averages. This leads us to the
following:
Hypothesis 2: In environmental decisions nudging affects genders differently:
As under Hypothesis 1, we speculate based on traditional gender stereotypes that:
Hypothesis 2a. Empathy nudges have a stronger impact on behavior of females than males
Hypothesis 2b. Financial nudges have a stronger impact on behavior of males than females
The study by N. Czap et al. (2015) showed that the combination of both incentives is highly effective
in encouraging pro-environmental behavior. Because the expectation is that empathy nudges are
more effective for females and financial nudges are more effective for males, the combination of
both should lead to a reduction in the difference between males and females:
Hypothesis 2c. Both genders are equally motivated by a combination of financial and empathy
nudging.
We further investigate in this paper differences in the degree of heterogeneity. For policy makers it
is attractive to tailor policies along easily identifiable characteristics, such as gender. This becomes
less attractive if within the sub-population identified based on such characteristic there is
substantial variance in response to the policy tool of interest, in this case financial and empathy
nudges. N. Czap et al. (2014) show that men display significantly less variance in terms of
environmental choices. Ex-ante this leads us to expect that we will find a similar pattern when it
comes to the impact of financial and empathy nudges:
Hypothesis 3: Males will display lower variation in their response to financial and empathy nudges
than females.
3. Experimental Design and Procedures
3.1 Context of the Game and the Players
We tested the hypotheses presented above using data from a framed laboratory experiment in the
context of farmers’ conservation behavior. The context of the experiment was given as a upstreamdownstream water pollution scenario. Downstream water pollution is a negative externality
resulting from the agricultural operations by upstream farmers, due to chemical runoff and soil
erosion. The downstream water users incur the social cost of pollution, as they have to clean water
more thoroughly than they would have to without pollution.
This game was played by two players, an Upstream Farmer (UF) and a Downstream Water User
(DWU). UF farms upstream and decides whether to use conservation tillage (CT) or intensive tillage
(IT) on a part or an entire plot of their land. If the farmer implements CT, the levels of soil erosion
and chemical runoff into the nearby rivers are lower, than if the farmer uses IT. DWU, therefore,
benefits from CT usage upstream since they are getting cleaner water downstream and, thus, spend
less on water cleanup. However, implementing CT is more costly for UF than implementing IT, as it
increases uncertainties regarding the farm yields and the planting and harvest time.
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3.2 Assigning Participants to the Roles
The downstream pollution situation represents a dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986) in a
context. Research shows that the division of the pie depends on several factors, including the
feeling of entitlement to serve as a divider (see for example Cherry et al, 2002; Cherry & Shogren,
2008; Oxoby & Spraggon, 2008). Typically the feeling of entitlement is achieved by linking the
divider’s role to a superior performance on a trivia quiz. Given that our participants are making
decisions in the agricultural context, we designed a farming quiz3. The quiz was comprised of 10
questions, related to agricultural practices, technologies and policies, which was testing the
participants knowledge of basic farming issues. We had two major reasons for using a farming quiz
instead of trivia questions. First, many farmers have been working on their lands for generations.
As such, many farmers have a strong sense of their right to have complete private property rights
on their land and, thus, the right to farm the way they see fit. In our experiment, having earned the
position to be a farmer by performing better on a quiz might instill a similar feeling of entitlement
in the participants. Second, the participants who performed better at the quiz were more likely to
have a farming background and, thus, could more easily identify with the role of a farmer. After the
completion of the game, we asked the UF players whether they agreed with the following
statement: “Since my performance on the farming quiz was in the top 50% and my partner’s was in
the bottom 50%, it was fair that I was playing the role of a farmer who decided on the level of CT”.
Overall 74% of the players agreed to that statement.
Prior to the quiz, the participants were informed that based on their results in the test, their roles
would be assigned and that those who performed better on the quiz would have more control over
their take-home payoffs. Based on the quiz results, the participants were ranked by their
performance. The top 50% were assigned the role of UF, while the rest took on the role of DWU.
3.3 Treatments and the Players’ Payoffs
The game consisted of 20 rounds. Prior to Round 1, the participants were provided with the game
instructions and asked to answer questions checking their understanding of instructions and the
calculation of the payoffs. The game did not start until everyone correctly calculated the payoffs.
For the first 10 rounds all participants played the same game to establish a baseline of conservation
behavior under the agricultural conservation policy that we called Old Policy. After 10 rounds the
conservation policy has changed – we called this New Policy. For the second 10 rounds a variant of
New Policy was implemented and the participants were assigned to one out of 4 treatments: no
nudging; financial nudging; empathy nudging; and empathy & financial nudging. We used “partners
matching”, so the UF-DWU pair was playing together for 20 rounds.
3.3.1 Old Policy
Each farmer was told that they had 500 acres of land. UF had to decide how many acres of land to
put under conservation (CT). The payoff of UF consisted of two parts: payoff from farming and
governmental subsidies. Payoff from farming was equal to 1500 − 2 ∗ 𝐶𝑇. The amount of
governmental subsidy depended on whether the farmer’s conservation level exceeded the
“conservation compliance” level of 250 acres. If CT was equal or greater than 250, then the subsidy
was 300. If CT was lower than 250, then the subsidy was 200.
The payoff of DWU consisted of two parts: payoff from using water and a tax that was used to pay
the farmers’ subsidy. The payoff from using water was equal to 500 + 2 ∗ 𝐶𝑇. The tax was equal to a
third of the subsidy. If the UF’s conservation level was equal to or exceeded the conservation
3

The quiz is available upon request.
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compliance level, the tax was 100(=300/3). If the UF did not comply, the tax was 66.67 (200/3).
The relation between the subsidy received by UF and the tax payed by DWU was modelling the real
world in the sense that the population pays taxes that are later used for subsidies, but the per
farmer subsidy is greater than the per citizen tax.
The Nash equilibrium is for UF to choose CT=0, resulting in a total payoff of 1700 for UF and 433 for
DWU. If UF chooses to adopt conservation on their entire plot of land (CT=500), then the total
payoff for UF is 800 and for DWU is 1400. If CT is equal to the compliance level of 250, then the total
payoff for UF is 1300 and for DWU is 900.
3.3.2 New Policy
After round 10, the participants were told the agricultural conservation policy had changed and
were provided with a new set of instructions and payoffs. The participants were randomly assigned
to one of the 4 treatments described below.
In the No nudging treatment, the entire amount of the subsidy (=300) was given to UF regardless of
the conservation level they chose. In the Financial nudging treatment, the entire amount of the
subsidy (300) was given to UF only if the conservation level was equal to or above the conservation
compliance level. In the Empathy nudging treatment, the setup and payoffs for the players were the
same as in the No nudging treatment. However, in this treatment DWU was invited to send UF a
message, nudging for empathy (see the description in the next subsection). The message was
passed to UF when she was about to decide on the CT level. The message carried no monetary
consequences for UF. The Financial&Empathy nudging treatment was a combination of the Financial
nudging and Empathy nudging treatments: DWU was sending a nudging message to UF and the
subsidy received by UF was conditional on conservation compliance.
3.4 Empathy nudging messages
The empathy nudging messages were developed on the basis of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index
(IRI) (Davis, 1980, 1983), which takes a multidimensional approach to empathy and includes four
subscales (perspective-taking, fantasy scale, empathetic concern, and personal distress). We used
two scales of IRI, perspective taking and fantasy. The perspective taking (PT) scale “assesses the
tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of others” (Davis, 1983, p.113).
Fantasy scale (FS) “taps respondents’ tendencies to transpose themselves imaginatively into the
feelings and actions of fictitious characters” (Davis, 1983, p.114). These two scales reflect the idea
of empathy as feeling with the other person and imagining “oneself in the shoes” of another person,
which is necessary for us to construct the messages nudging for empathy conservation (Lynne et al.,
in press).
PT and FS each contain 7 statements. Examples of PT statements are: “I sometimes try to
understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective” and “Before
criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.” Examples of FS are:
“I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel” and “When I am reading an
interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the events in the story were happening to
me.” The first step in developing our empathy nudging messages was choosing the key phrases
from each statement. Several statements included similar phrases such as “look at everybody's
side” and “look at both sides of the question”. After eliminating similar phrases, we ended up with 6
distinct key phrases. On the second step we used the 6 key phrases to write a message that DWU
can send to UF. We wrote 12 messages, each starting with “Before choosing the level of CT this year,
please...”. The second part of the message was containing the key phrase and was written using
either personal (e.g. “... see your decision from my point of view”) or general (e.g. “... see your
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decision from the DWU’s point of view”) appeal (Table 1).
Table 1. List of empathy nudging messages
Personal appeal

General appeal

Before choosing the level of CT this year, please...
1.

... see your decision from my point of view

... see your decision from the DWU's point of view

2. ... understand my situation better by
imagining how your decision looks from
my perspective

... understand the DWU's situation better by
imagining how your decision looks from the
DWU's perspective

3. ... look at both your and my side

... look at both your and the DWU's side

4. ... put yourself in my place

... put yourself in the DWU's place

5. ... try to put yourself in my shoes for a
while

... try to put yourself in the DWU's shoes for a
while

6. ... imagine how you would feel in my place

... imagine how you would feel in the DWU's place

3.5 Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the XXX University. The experimental subjects were recruited on
campus via emails and flyers posted and distributed across campus. In total 400 students and
members of the community participated in the experiment, with 100 in each of the treatments.
About half of the participants were females. The experiment was computerized and administered
using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Each session lasted 90 minutes. The
earnings in the game were in tokens. At the end of the experiment the tokens were converted into
dollars at the rate of $1 = 500 tokens. The money was paid privately in cash. The experiment was
incentive-compatible with the average take-home earnings of $43.6. This amount was much higher
than the participants’ opportunity cost, which is typically the minimum wage.
Participants were making decisions privately and anonymously. Their earnings were tracked only
by a 5-digit random number. First, the participants took the farming quiz described above. Next,
they read the instructions for Rounds 1-10 on their computer screens. They also received a printed
summary of experimental instructions and a table showing possible payoffs for UF and DWU. The
summary of instructions was read aloud to make it public information. Next, participants were
given a quiz4 to check their understanding of the instructions and ability to calculate payoffs. The
game did not start until all participants correctly answered the questions and calculated the
payoffs. At this point the participants were reminded about their performance on the farming quiz
(top 50% or bottom 50%) and got assigned their role (UF and DWU respectively). After the first 10
rounds of the game were completed, the participants received a new set of instructions,
corresponding to the appropriate treatment) for Rounds 11–20. As previously, they also received a
summary with instructions and payoffs, which was again read aloud. UF and DWU group stayed
unchanged till the end of the experiment. Both players knew that they were playing with the same
partner. However, they did not know any other information about the partner, including the
gender.
4
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4. Experimental Results
During the Old Policy part of the game UF females put 204 acres (out of 500) under conservation,
compared to 198 acres by UF males. This is well above predictions based on the Nash equilibrium,
which is to place zero acres under conservation. Since DWU was a passive party in this game, there
were no strategic considerations for the UF to behave this way. Based on this results we can
conclude that there is no gender difference in the initial decision regarding CT levels.
We begin by comparing the relative effectiveness of empathy and financial nudging by gender. We
calculated the percentage change in each of the 4 treatments as compared to Old Policy. When the
participants switched from Old Policy to No-nudging, the average CT went down by 19% for females
and 10% for males (Fig. 1). This indicates that the removal of the conservation compliance as a
condition of receiving the subsidy led to a, not unexpected, decrease in conservation. Financial
nudging and empathy nudging were equally effective for females, increasing conservation by 6% as
compared to conservation under Old Policy. However, for males we observe that only financial
nudging was effective. When both nudges were combined, it produced a synergetic effect for
females with the conservation increasing by 40%. For males, however, a combination of nudges
was less effective in relative terms than financial nudging alone.

Figure 1. Percentage change in conservation in response to the policy change by gender
50%

Females

40%

Males

40%

30%
22%
20%

16%

10%

6%

6%

0%
No nudging
-10%
-10%
-20%

Financial nudging

Empathy nudging
-3%

Empathy & Financial
nudging

-19%

-30%
NOTE: The numbers show the percentage change from Old Policy.

To evaluate the significance of the treatment effects on the absolute changes in conservation levels,
we estimated a regression model for each gender separately (Table 2).
We observed two similarities and two differences between the reactions of each gender on different
nudging. The similarities are: (1) in the absence of nudging the conservation efforts by males as
well as females decreased (the coefficients in front of the variable Old policy are below one) and (2)
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financial nudging is effective for both genders as compared to no nudging (the coefficients in front
of the variable Financial nudging are statistically significant and positive). The differences are:
(1) for females empathy nudging is as effective as financial nudging (both coefficients are
statistically significant and almost equal), while for males empathy nudging is not effective at all;
(2) for females a combination of empathy and financial nudging is much more effective than each
type of nudging alone, while for males the combination of nudges only marginally more effective
than for females. Overall these results offered support for Hypothesis 1. We also found support for
1a and partial support for 1c, while 1b is not supported.
Table 2. Average treatment effect by gender

Intercept
Treatment 2 - FINANCIAL NUDGING
Treatment 3 - EMPATHY NUDGING
Treatment 4 - EMPATHY & FINANCIAL NUDGING
Old Policy†

Number of observations
R-squared (adjusted)

Females

Males

12.6

6.18

(23.8)

(17.1)

48.9**

45.6**

(23.5)

(17.6)

49.8**

13.0

(22.4)

(18.0)

102.1***

56.5***

(22.3)

(18.4)

0.76***

0.87***

(0.07)

(0.06)

89

111

0.59

0.70

NOTES: † - Average CT under Old Policy. Dependent variable: Average CT under New Policy. Standard errors
are in parentheses. Significance: ** - 0.05; *** - 0.01.

Next, we compare the effectiveness of each of the nudges between the genders. We are testing for
two effects: (1) whether males and females are responding differently to the change in policy and
(2) whether females and males react differently to nudging. For each of the treatments we
constructed a regression, which included a gender dummy (Female) and the interaction between
the gender dummy with the past behavior (Old Policy). The regression results (Table 3) indicated
that the strongest predictor of behavior is what the participants were doing before the policy
changed as indicated by highly significant coefficient in front of Old Policy. We found no gender
difference in the No nudging and Financial nudging treatments: the coefficients in front of Female
and the interaction term are not statistically significant. In the Empathy nudging treatment we
observed that females placed 65.2 acres of land more under conservation than the males did. The
gender difference is both statistically and economically significant as the total amount of land
available is 500 acres. The results also indicated the gender difference in the response to the policy
change. After empathy nudging was introduced, males continue conservation at the same level as in
the prior rounds: the coefficient in front of Old Policy is very close to one (0.98). For females, in
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contrast, the dependence on the previous policy was lower by 0.22 (as indicated by the coefficient
in front of Female X Old Policy). In the case of the combination of empathy and financial nudging we
found that females placed 73.4 acres of land more under conservation than the males did. The
gender difference is weakly statistically (at 10%) significant. However, it is economically significant
as it represents close to 15% of all available land. In this treatment there was no gender difference
in response to the policy change.
To summarize, we observed two similarities and one gender difference. The similarities are: (1) in
the absence of nudging there is no statistically significant difference in the conservation levels of
males and females. (2) financial nudging is statistically and economically effective in increasing
conservation and does so by a similar degree, as evident by the similar coefficients in Table 2 and
the statistically insignificant difference in Table 3. The key gender difference is that empathy
nudging is substantially more effective for females than for males. With respect to the combination
of the empathy and financial nudging, we found only weak evidence that it is more effective for
females. Overall these results offer support for Hypothesis 2. We also found support for 2a, while 2b
is not supported. Hypothesis 2c is only partially supported in the sense that the combination of
nudges is effective in changing behavior for both genders, but it is significantly more powerful for
females than for males.
Table 3. Effect of (no) nudging by gender
No
nudging

Financial
nudging

Empathy
nudging

Empathy &
financial nudging

11.3

62.7

-3.05

68.0*

(30.6)

(20.4)

(20.0)

(34.9)

13.5

-47.0

65.2**

73.4*

(65.8)

(37.9)

(29.7)

(43.8)

0.85***

0.80***

0.98***

0.85***

(0.12)

(0.10)

(0.08)

(0.14)

-0.14

0.18

-0.22*

-0.24

(0.26)

(0.17)

(0.12)

(0.19)

50

50

50

50

0.53

0.69

0.81

0.53

Intercept
Female (Yes=1, No=0)
Old Policy†
Female X Old Policy

Number of observations
R-squared (adjusted)

NOTES: † - Average CT under Old Policy. Dependent variable: Average CT under New Policy.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance: * - 0.1; ** - 0.05; *** - 0.01.

5. Conclusion and recommendations
This paper belongs to a very short list of papers that discuss gender differences in the effectiveness
of nudges. The difference in the results among the few existing papers highlights the need for more
research in various contexts and with varying nudges. The current paper looks at nudges in the
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context of agricultural policy and the impact of financial vs. empathy nudges on conservation
behavior. We found that for women financial nudging and empathy nudging are equally effective
(defying gender stereotypes), but the combination of the two is by far more effective. For men,
financial nudging was a lot more effective than empathy nudging (conforming to stereotypes) and
the combination of the two is not much more effective than the financial nudge by itself. When it
comes to the effectiveness of the nudges based on gender, it turned out that financial nudges did
not result in significantly different outcomes between males and females (defying stereotypes)
whereas empathy nudging did – females reacted significantly more to empathy nudges individually
(conforming to stereotypes) as well as to the combination of the two nudges.
Empathy nudging is a potentially attractive tool for policy makers. While the studies by N. Czap et
al. (2015) and H. Czap et al. (2016) show, in the same experimental context, that on average
financial nudging is more effective than empathy nudging and the combination of nudges vastly
more powerful than each nudge individually, the analysis in this paper demonstrates that this is
gender dependent. Currently the agricultural industry is still dominated by male farm operators. As
such the current paper implies that the best policy is till based on financial incentives only, or
perhaps in conjunction with empathy nudging as such nudging is quite cheap. However, if current
trends of increased female ownership and management of farm operations will continue, the
recommended design might very well shift to one incorporating significantly more “soft” nudges,
such as the empathy nudges used in the experiment. From a practitioner’s perspective these nudges
could be provided through letters specifically addressed at farm operators to walk-in-the-shoes of
others affected by farming practices and nature, through education meetings in which the extension
officers provide verbal and non-verbal cues to be more empathetic to the wildlife, and through local
efforts to build a sense of community and belonging to the ecosystem.
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